Euthanasia, Or Death Assisted to (Its) Dignity by Istvan, Kiraly V.
Euthanasia, Or Death Assisted to (Its) Dignity 
 
István  KIRÁLY V. 
Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj 
Department of Philosophy 
 
 
                     Motto: 
“The person who really loves me 
 will be the one who helps me die”. 
 
Dialogue from Alejandro Amenábar’s motion  
picture entitled The Sea Inside (Mar Adentro). 
 
Keywords: euthanasia, dying, death, existential analitics; fundamental ontology, 
ontology of death, metaphysics of death 
 
Abstract: The paper attempts to conceptualize the “ancient” issues of human death 
and human mortality in connection to the timely and vital subject of euthanasia. This 
subject forces the meditation to actually consider those ideological, ethical, 
deontological, legal, and metaphysical frameworks which guide from the very 
beginning any kind of approach to this question. This conception – in dialogue with 
Heideggerian fundamental ontology and existential analytics – reveals that, on the 
one hand, the concepts and ethics of death are originally determined by the ontology 
of death, and, on the other hand, that, on this account, the question of euthanasia can 
only be authentically discussed in the horizon of this ontology. It is only this that 
may reveal to whom dying – our dying – pertains, while it also reveals our 
relationship to euthanasia as a determined human potentiality or final possibility. 
Thus euthanasia is outlined in the analysis as the possibility of becoming a mortal on 
the one hand, while on the other hand it appears in relation to the particularities of its 
existential structure, which essentially differ from the existential and ontological 
structure of any other possibility of dying. This is why it should not be mixed up 
with, or mistaken for, any of these.  
 
E-mail: kiraly_philobib@yahoo.com 
 
* 
 
I.  Obstacles of thinking about euthanasia 
Already in its original meaning the Greek term of “euthanasia” meant “good death”. 
However, the way in which people conceived death, or what they regarded at all as 
death, or especially “good” death, has changed continuously throughout the ages, 
cultures, and civilizations. To begin with, in Greek culture and philosophy, for 
instance, one of the basic and almost constant meanings of philosophy or 
philosophizing was the meléte thanátou, the actual practice of preparing oneself for 
a dignified death. This also renders the meaning of “good death” as it was 
understood by the Greeks. In spite of this the Hippocratic Oath forbade even at that 
time the active participation of the physician in ending one’s life.  
 In opposition to this, Christianity seems to refrain from its very beginnings 
from conceiving of any kind of “good death”. The primary reason for this is 
probably not even the fact that it would reject the attachment of any kind of positive 
attribute – the attribute of goodness – to something as utterly negative as death. 
Much rather, the reason is that in Christian mentality death is implicitly and sui 
generis connected to the original sin, and therefore it is indeed impossible to relate it 
to any qualities of “good-ness”. According to Old Testament Judaism and later 
Christianity, the “certain” death springs from sin, and it is nothing else than the 
payment, the punishment for sin. Thus it cannot possibly be anything that should be 
made better or easier. 
 Consequently, it is not so much the inner negativity of the act of dying, but 
rather its state of punishment which induces Christianity to essentially and a priori 
reject euthanasia. At any rate, this induces it more directly than, say, its convictions 
related to the sacred, divine origin of life or its reverence, as Christianity itself has 
eliminated quite some “lives” in the course of time, or even today any civilized 
Western army hardly ever marches into a war – that is killing – without the 
reassuring assistance of the camp ministers. 
 
* 
It has become a bibliographical commonplace by now that the Greek word 
euthanasia was first used in early modernity in a medical-healing context by a 
philosopher, the Englishman Sir Francis Bacon in his study The Knowledge of 
Man’s Body, where he formulated his personal opinion that a physician’s task is not 
merely to restore health, but also to ease one’s passage from life when the time has 
come. This is stated also in the title of a subchapter of this book: De euthanasia 
exteriore, which is distinguished, within brackets, from the spiritual preparation 
(preparation of the Soul) for death, for dying.
1
 But why did Bacon use the Greek 
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 See: Lord Bacon’s Essay Continued in Twenty Seven Chapters Translated from this 
Lordship’s Treatise De Augmentis Scientiarum. By William Willmott, Volume the Second, 
London, 1720. p. 209-210 
(http://books.google.ro/books?id=ry8CAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA209&dq=Francia+Bacon+Euth
anasia&hl=ro&sa=X&ei=VzVzT8-
QPMfVsgbryrnrDQ&ved=0CFoQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q&f=false) (Downloaded 30 
March 2012) and even more precisely: De euthanasia exteriore : “Nay further, I esteem it the 
office of a physician not only to restore health, but to mitigate pain and dolors; and not only 
when such mitigation may conduce to recovery, but when it may serve to make a fair and 
easy passage: for it is no small felicity which Augustu Caesar was wont to wish to himself, 
that same Euthanasia; and which was specially noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose 
death was after the fashion and semblance of a kindly and pleasant sleep. So it is written of 
Epicurus, that after his disease was judged desperate, he drowned his stomach and senses 
with a large draught and ingurgitation of wine; whereupon the epigram was made, Hinc 
Stygias ebrius hausit aquas; he was not sober enough to taste any bitterness of the Stygian 
water. But the physicians contrariwise do make a kind of scruple and religion to stay with the 
patient after the disease is deplored; whereas, in my judgment, they ought both to enquire the 
word euthanasia in a text originally written in Latin when there had already been 
several books written in Latin, and also translated into other languages, about the 
Christian meanings and “practices” of “good death” (mors bona) and the art of dying 
(Ars moriendi)?  
Most importantly, Bacon must have tried to emphasize the human-bodily as 
well as the medical aspects of things and thoughts connected to this issue, focussing 
meanwhile not so much on the questions of a Christian’s preparation for death, but 
on the actual problems, pains, sufferings of dying. Also, possibly with regard to the 
fact that in matters of dying and agony the ruling Christian mentality of the age was 
not so much interested in the sufferings of the dying person but much rather by the 
fact that, as a result of “constitutive” human weaknesses, these pains and sufferings 
can be a doorway for the workings of the devil. Who, of course, is lurking, ready for 
action, especially in real moments of crisis, such as dying. These must be fended off 
by appropriate, step-by-step practices, in order to reach salvation, which is highly 
dependable on the events of the last moments before one’s death.1 
                                                                                                                              
skill and to give the attendances for the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and agonies of 
death.“ In Francis Bacon, Selected Writings, with an introduction and notes by Hugh G. Dick 
(New York, The Modern Library & Randon House, 1955), Book 2, 277–278. and: “... etiam 
plane censeo ad officium medici pertinere, non tantim ut sanitatem restituat: verum etiam ut 
dolores et cruciatus moborum mitiget: neque id ipsum solummodo, cum illamitigatio doloris, 
veluti symptomatis periculosi, ad convalescentiam faciat et conducat; imo vero cum abjecta 
prorsus omni sanitatis ipse, excessum tantum praebeat e vita magis lenem et 
placidum. Siquidem non parva est felicitas pars (quam sibi tantopere precari solebat 
Augustus Cesar) illa euthanasia; quae etiam observata est in excessum Antonius Pius, 
quando non tam mori videretur, quam dulci et alto sopore excipi. Scribitur etiam de Epicuro, 
quod hoc ipsum sibi procuraverit: cum enim morbus ejus haberetur pro desperato, 
ventriculum et sensus, meri largiore hausto et ingurgatione obruit; une illud in 
Epigrammate:Hinc Stygias ebrius haustit aquas (vino felicitet stygii laticis amaritudinem 
sustulit).  At nostris temporibus, medicis quasi religio est, aegrotis, postquam deplorati sint, 
affidere; ubi meo judicio, si officio suo atque adeo humanitati ipsi deesse nolint, et artem 
edificere etintelligentiam praestare deberunt, quam animam agentes, facilius et mitius e vita 
demigrent. Hanc autem partem, inquisitionem de euthanasie exteriori (ad differentiam ejus 
euthanasia quae animae preparationem respicit) appelamus, eamque inter desiderata 
reponimus.”  Source: Francisci Baconi, Baronis de Verulamio, De Dignitate et Augmentis 
Scientiarum dans Novum Organum (1623), Wirceburgi, Jo. Jac. Stahel, (1779), 292–294, 
http://books.google.ca/  (source: 
http://agora.qc.ca/thematiques/mort.nsf/Dossiers/Euthanasie_Terminologie:_Francis_Bacon, 
(downloaded 30 March 2012), and Ian Dowbiggin, A Concise History of Euthanasia: Life, 
Death, God, and Medicine (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland,  2007), 23–24.  
http://books.google.ro/books?id=CNigO7gMGkUC&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=euthanasia+
and+Francis+Bacon&source=bl&ots=Q2vOF69Ei5&sig=wqOR8gNiWYVZPZz5PWQv5  
(downloaded 30 March 2012) 
1
 It may suffice to mention: Ars Moriendi ex variis scripturarum sententiis collecta cum 
figuris ad resistendum in mortis agone diabolicae sugestioni, ed.. Johan WEISSENBURGER, 
(Landshut, 1514). http://www.digitale-sammlungen.de/~db/0001/bsb00011658/images/ 
FIDES Digital Library http://digital.fides.org.pl/Content/525/page1.html (downloaded 5 
April 2012), or a Hungarian edition,  Frances M. M. Comper, ed., Ars Moriendi: A meghalás 
művészete, trans. László Virág (Budapest: Arcticus, 2004). Both of these clearly prove that 
* 
 
It is also true however, that “euthanasia” was used in the Nazi Germany as an excuse 
for unimaginable genocides. That is, in this country the mentally or physically 
disabled people or those suffering from degenerative illnesses were simply gassed in 
the name of “euthanasia” and in reference to “racial hygiene”,1 as “lives without 
life-value”. This is why Germans are still reluctant today to call the subject of this 
paper “euthanasia” in their own language, choosing to use the term Sterbehilfe, or 
more precisely aktives Sterbehilfe instead.  
 Presumably it is because of similar reasons that the Hungarian language also 
bewares of the term “euthanasia” and in its stead uses the term “gracious death”, 
much more condescendingly than the German Sterbehilfe. An expression, that is, the 
meaning of which, instead of validating certain ontological situations or contingent 
“rights”, explains such a death – such dying – as a benign and condescending 
practice of some kind of “grace”… However, the situation is quite similar in English 
as well, as shown by the term mercy killing, which also denotes something merciful, 
gracious, or an act of benefaction – and what is more, it also means “killing”… 
 These terminological inconsistencies, groping hesitations and ambiguities 
are in fact very telling in their own ways. They betray the fact that, despite the 
ancient, original, and universal nature of the phenomenon of death, we people have 
failed to face from the very beginning the serious and manifold possible complexity 
of death’s particular potentiality and its also particular pertinence to us, people. This 
situation is probably the explanation of the fact that we hardly have any words even 
today to express and conceive of that what the ancient Greek name of euthanasia 
tried to paraphrase. This happened even then in multiple directions, because of 
which the term still stands in the wide and contradictory polyvalence of its history, 
so much so that it is almost impossible to attribute some kind of deep and 
particularly outlined meaning to it.  
 The major problem apparently is that in our languages any kind of 
“privation” from “life” mostly, directly, and simply qualifies as “killing”. And the 
term “killing” primarily means “the act of killing” in reference to a generally 
understood human or even animal “life”…2 With no regard whatsoever to any kinds 
of circumstances – for instance, the quality of life, etc.  
 Clearly, under such conditions, euthanasia, despite all its endeavors to 
goodness, inevitably remains only a kind of “killing”, that is, a kind of negativity 
and negation which is related to the indissoluble negativity which dying is to us. In 
this way euthanasia – inevitably and necessarily – seems something which hurries to 
present itself in a deceitful and definitely suspicious way as a kind of “good killing”! 
 Nonetheless, the penury of language always hides the penuries of existence 
and, naturally, of thinking! That is, it hides existential and historical insufficiencies, 
                                                                                                                              
the primary stake of the Christian care for dying – or, more precisely, the dying person – is to 
fend off the “suggestions”, temptations of the devil, and nothing else! 
1
 Cf. Philippa Foot, “Euthanasia,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1977): 85–112. 
2
 Cf. A magyar nyelv történeti-etimológiai szótára (Hungarian Language Dictionary of 
Historical Etymology), ed. Benkő Loránd (Budapest, 1967). 
more precisely, the insufficiencies which occur in a man’s history of existence as he 
faces his own mortality and death. In fact, it grasps and formulates in a most radical 
and serious way precisely the Heideggerian statement that the man is still not a 
mortal even now and even today, although his life is finite, so he always dies. 
Actually, what is primarily implied here is the fact that in the course of millennia the 
man has mostly thought of (his) mortality or (his) death without considering his own 
dying.  
 Therefore, the reason why we have no words in our languages by which we 
can conceive of “euthanasia” in a serious, open, and indeed consistent way is that we 
are still lacking the essential conception of the act of dying – the factual finiteness of 
human life! It is by this that we humans – that is, “conscious” beings with a finite 
life – could actually enable for ourselves our (doubtless) mortality, (our) death, and 
especially (our) dying.  
 In spite of this people generally still think of death as a kind of usually 
confusing termination of life. That is, as the end of life. It is only in this aspect that 
there is any sense in speaking about a “good death”, of something, that is, which is 
supposed to end a “good life” in a “good” way, or which, by its peculiar kind of 
pertinence to life (by the very ending of it) deserves some kind of special attention. 
And which, therefore, can or must be “good” in itself, in its own nature.  
 However, as far as the recent actuality of the problematic theme of 
euthanasia is concerned, it is multiple even today. The most ostentatious is in this 
case too the fashion- and journalism actuality of the subject. We see almost daily 
that the yellow press and all kinds of “media” strenuously pick up, as if in a 
campaign, all the cases of and references to euthanasia, about which, certainly, all 
mentalities and the representatives of all the institutions and organizations 
“embodying” them express their irrevocable and unfailing standpoints and 
declarations. However, the mediocre voices of all these standpoints also intrude into 
the theory of the question, to such an extent that they usually define and outline it.
1
 
 Still, this is not why we are interested here and now in the problem of 
euthanasia. But, simply and concisely, re-emphasizing the problem in a first person 
singular form: I am interested in the subject of euthanasia because I know and fear 
myself to be mortal, and naturally those too, who stand close to, or on the contrary, 
quite far from me! Primarily this is why, as far as possible, I wish to understand the 
problem and subject of euthanasia, which, I repeat, is not one “outside” me, but one 
which belongs into my world as a heavy and oppressing potentiality. 
Then, because of this, the expression “as far as possible” used above should 
be understood literally, as it supposed to mean that I will try to grasp my death or 
death in general as a particular, yet at the same time effective possibility, pertinent 
to myself and  my world, by the possibility and challenges of euthanasia. 
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 One of the most telling examples in this respect is Raphael Cohen-Almagor’s book:  
Euthanasia in the Netherlands: The Policy and Practice of Mercy Killing (Boston, 
Dordrecht, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 195. 
II. Thinking and inquiring euthanasia… 
In fact, euthanasia itself is, above all, a possibility. As such, and as all possibilities: it 
is questionable. That is, euthanasia should not only be accounted for as only a 
“potentiality” or “virtuality”, an accidental, yet actual “possibility”… but it is 
essentially questionable, as a consequence of its particularly outlined potential 
nature; or rather: it actually is a question, what is more: an existential question! 
 But, in the end, whose question is the question of euthanasia? Who else’s 
could it possibly be than the mortal man’s? That is: whose question could the 
question of euthanasia possibly be than that of the being who, while existing, 
questions himself, his own existence – and thus necessarily his own death as well – 
by this question? And who, because of this, by the peculiar problematic nature of 
death, discloses, outlines, weighs and sketches for himself the questionable 
possibility of euthanasia. I repeat: expressedly as a question.  
 There are several reasons why the case of euthanasia has only recently – 
mainly after the Second World War – become an unavoidable center of interest. It 
was exactly this period when the circumstances of the ending of people’s lives – 
recte: their dying – have considerably changed. Primarily, due to the development 
and spreading of medical care and public sanitation, in parallel with the increase of 
general living standards, the people’s average life expectancy has considerably 
increased. Additionally, there have been important changes in the reasons of dying 
as well as the structure and ways of dying. While in the 1940s most people died as 
victims of acute illnesses or accidents, today the major reason of the death of most 
people in the civilized countries is chronic, that is, long-lasting and evolving-
degenerative illnesses,
1
 which, naturally, also influence the quality and dignity of 
aged people’s lives. Thus, for instance, the reason for half of the suicides of people 
in their 50’s, and 70% of the suicides of people in their 70’s has been identified to be 
the suffering caused by chronic diseases, and the loss of any kind of perspectives 
and dignity connected to it.
2
  
 As a consequence to all this, recently dying itself has increasingly become 
the focus of thinking, mentality and care about death. More precisely, the focus is on 
how and when we/people die? These questions are entangled into more and more 
emphatic and unavoidable challenges for all the traditional modes of dealing with 
death,
3
 including their dominance defined mainly by mentality. This shows in fact 
                                                 
1
 See: Rommel W Meckelprang and Rommel D. Meckelprang, “Historical and 
Contemporary Issues in End-of-Life Decisions: Implication for Social Work,” Social Work 
50 (Oct. 2005): 315–325. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 The discussions connected to euthanasia and “medically assisted” suicide became harsher 
following the legalization in 1997 of the “medically assisted suicide” in the state of Oregon, 
and in 2002 the acceptance of euthanasia in the Netherlands and Belgium. The analysis of 
the application and effects of these laws is going on today, in parallel with possibilities of 
extending it to, e.g., incurable diseases which cause unbearable suffering and certain death, 
to infants born with serious handicaps, and to underage children. Moreover, the jurisdiction 
of the European Union prioritizes the harmonization of national laws on euthanasia with the 
European laws in formation. See also: Sissel Johansen, Jacob Chr. Holen, Stein Kaasa, Jon 
Havard Loge, and Lars Johan Matersvedt, “Attitudes toward, and wishes for, euthanasia in 
the extent to which traditions in their actual novelty are able and willing to accept 
the “bio-ethical”, medical, deontological, and especially “thanatological” problems 
occurring in this way, and again, to radically rethink the problem of death urged or 
compelled by these traditions. 
 Euthanasia – as mentioned above – is primarily, still, a possibility. A 
possibility, which is particularly articulated within the particularly human and 
present – at the same time ontological and existential – possibility and potentiality of 
death. Meaning, in the late Heideggerian terminology, that euthanasia is exactly one 
of the particular, determined, and factual possibilities of “becoming a mortal”.  
 As such, obviously euthanasia is primarily a possibility connected directly to 
dying itself. And “within” this, to how and – indirectly – to when do we die? Thus 
not even the mere name of euthanasia can be conceived without the conception of a 
thematic anticipation of (one’s own) death – or, more precisely, dying. Actually, 
euthanasia articulates nothing else than death pertaining to the dying person as his 
own, usually together with its whole, seriously and effectively oppressive and 
problematic nature.  
 Hence euthanasia is a disputed possibility. The most common debates 
primarily concern various ethical (including also deontological) and ideological, and 
in strong connection to these, legal and political issues,
1
 often in a philosophical 
approach. However, the exclusively ontological-existential approaches are almost 
completely missing.  
 Nevertheless, it is quite problematic to see from the very beginning the 
extent to which these ethical, deontological, ideological and political approaches are 
aware of their own original and ontological determination by death. Even more 
problematic it is, however, to see in what degree they acquire, interiorize and 
validate their original, radical, and once again, ontological determination by death.  
                                                                                                                              
advanced cancer patients at a palliative medicine unit,” Palliative Medicine 19 (2005): 454–
460. 
1
 The politicians of the legislative bodies are in fact always dependent not only on the 
automatic constraints of their own ideological convictions, but also on the prejudices of 
public opinion – manipulated by all kinds of influences and continuously determining the 
results of elections – which they mostly have to take into consideration. However, it is 
important to be aware of the fact that this public opinion is actually completely prone to 
change and formation. The opinions of public opinion do not spring from themselves, but 
they are cultivated and bred! It is this kind of breeding of opinion in which the public ideas 
are formed and thrive according to which the possibility of euthanasia is a kind of – naturally 
“unnatural”, “superficial”, and “intolerable” – liberty in relation to the ways of dying similar 
to the naturalness of the liberty with which people choose, say, the street-car that they take… 
“Naturally”, no word is spoken about the fact that – as opposed to street-cars – death cannot 
be chosen or changed, nor transferred… The only thing which could be chosen to some 
extent is the way it should happen… But even so the well-bred public opinion usually 
pictures euthanasia as if it meant that, let’s say, on gloomy Sunday afternoons the people 
more depressed than usual are assisted in a nearby euthanatological bistro to pass over all the 
difficulties of life for a reasonable price or directly as a social insurance service... However, 
despite all this, the surveys frequently show that the decisive majority of people support 
some modality of euthanasia. 
 However, beyond its direct existential – that is, directly vital – importance, 
the actual philosophical distinction of the question of euthanasia primarily stands in 
the fact that it can return ethics, law, ideologies, philosophies and naturally the 
people dealing with these to the roots of the effective and essential ontological 
origins lying in their own deaths, in human mortality! And, obviously, to the explicit 
historical unfolding and acceptance of this origin.  
 At the same time, this recognition may lead to the admission of the fact that 
this origin can never become completely surmountable or manageable for any kind 
of ethics, deontology, legal system, ideology, etc. On the contrary, it is only the 
exclusively philosophical examination of this origin which can provide that 
historically changing, appearing, and always re-questioning disclosure on the basis 
of which all these existential regions, again continuously questioning, can now truly 
re-connect to their actual historical (ontological) roots and origins. Also, with the 
additional possibility or perhaps necessity of the recognition that in the course of the 
analysis of the ontological roots of euthanasia it is not “life in general” that one 
should initially start from, but death, respectively its pertinence to life as specifically 
– one’s own – dying.1 Euthanasia is connected to nothing else than precisely the life 
just dying, and to the peculiar “experience” of dying; more precisely: this is exactly 
what euthanasia means! Because it is not life, but the living what dies, and only thus 
does the perspective of the death of life have its gravity and articulated meaning.  
 Therefore the ontological-hermeneutic specificity and basic situation of 
euthanasia is the ontological specificity of the life and the living being just dying or 
reflecting upon – usually his own – dying. That is, we are not speaking about the 
“conceptual” – and mostly contrary – specificities of a general (conceptual) “life” or 
an also general (conceptual) “death”, the various definitions of which (ethical, 
deontological, legal, ideological, etc.) we would then try to sort out. Instead, we are 
speaking about the recognition that it is only mortal beings for whom the rules, the 
“imperatives”, or any kinds of duties or problems of relationships have a meaning or 
a real weight in advance! Referring of course to both the observance and the 
violation, and accordingly the rewarding or punishment of these.  
 In opposition to this, at a closer look one might see that the term 
“immortal”, which for some reason always comes up in connection to “death”, 
necessarily has in mind something which – at least according to definition – is 
untouchable in reference to the existence of the living. So a more thorough analysis 
of “immortality”, also because of more traditional metaphysical reasons, would do 
no harm.  
 A “lifeless” dead can only be someone who had previously lived. Stones, 
though lifeless, are not dead. Consequently death and the lifelessness of death also 
pertain to life, naturally, as the loss of life. Well, the case with immortality is 
somewhat similar.  
 This is so because the so-called metaphysical “eternal beings” (aei ontá, as 
Aristotle calls them) are not necessarily “immortal” as well. It could well be that 
they had never been alive – that is, they never live. Immortal can only be something 
which has been alive and which is consequently still alive continuously and/or 
                                                 
1
 And not from some kind of framework-like “right” for “self-determination”.  
eternally. Such a thing is called “immortal” because we think of it as something 
which is – while alive! – deprived of death. That is, as something which, eternally-
living – is. It is therefore the being-alive – more precisely the “sheer life” – of such a 
thing which does not “depend” on, and cannot be touched by, anything. Its being-
alive is thus in no way connected to Nothing.  
 This way the undestroyable and unbreakable How-being of everything 
which is “immortal” can necessarily, primarily and completely be nothing else at all 
than indifferent! That is: it could be “this way” or “that way”, or it could also be 
“like this” or “like that”, but all these can only be incidental and actually only 
indifferent possibilities. But these could never be real and thus serious (alive-
)existential possibilities connected to its being-alive within its existence, such that 
would deeply and hazardously influence its being-alive in an existential way... 
 Nothing can ever present any risk for the life, the being-alive of something 
immortal. Its eternal, deathless, being-alive life cannot be put to risk even by itself. 
Everything – how it is, how it is like – is utterly, existentially and necessarily 
weightless or indifferent to it – everything that we, people would refer to as 
“immortal” in a quite thoughtless way. Because everything immortal exists in such a 
way from its very beginning that it always is (alive). Actually, it is always 
impossible for it not to be alive, or to be not alive. Regardless also of How? it is 
alive… always … or rather … just… 
 In a serious way of thinking: no other definite quality can be conceived as 
related to the immortal than a kind of constant – that is, in fact eternal – living 
quality. In opposition to this, any kind of (other) qualities can be related to it at any 
time on a constant – that is, eternal – basis… That is, only incidentally and only 
weightlessly… and in the end with a tracelessness and weightlessness of existence 
that disappears into eternity, into the eternal being-alive. 
 Therefore any kind of “striving” of such a thing to justness or rightfulness – 
and especially the “constancy” or “regularity” of such strivings – is completely 
incomprehensible and meaningless, too – if not an absurdity! 
 At any rate, the immortal is completely and eternally “on this side” of any 
“good” or “evil”, “fair” or “unfair”, “right” or “wrong”, etc. And it cannot ever 
possibly reach them – it can never reach beyond “good” and “evil”. That is, not only 
is it impossible for it to stand at the basis of ethics, legal systems, ideologies, etc., 
but it cannot even judge those. Because, in a nutshell: it has no possibility to become 
mortal! Not even as an accidental eventuality!  
 Therefore things like “ethics”, “deontology”, “law”, or rightfulness only 
have meaning, weight, significance and accessibility for entities which, as a 
consequence of their existence, are also somehow forced to have a meaning, a 
weight and some significance to the quality of their lives. Those entities which are 
mortal and can die! 
 Meaning is also created of course by interpretation, and all interpretations 
are actually projections upon the possibilities. The horizon of the possibilities is 
most deeply disclosed – in a questionable and factual way – by the possibility of 
impossibility. And it is also factually and questionably articulated by the same thing: 
namely, by death itself.  
 Death and dying deeply articulate thus, in and from the depth of existence, 
all kinds of ethics, ideologies, deontology, law, politics and, what is more, also 
philosophy and metaphysics with an ontological reference to their origin and 
meaning, although in a non-thematic way. And it does not harm ethics, legal 
systems, ideologies, politics, deontology, and of course metaphysics to be aware of 
this. Especially at a time when they judge death from above – that is, their very 
basis, source and roots! 
 Naturally, the meditation on euthanasia could be a distinguished occasion of 
applied philosophy to acknowledge these aspects. And these recognitions ought also 
to guide the commentaries on euthanasia.  
 Our approach to euthanasia depends in fact on the ontology of death, that is, 
the factual metaphysics of death, and only indirectly and secondarily on how it can 
be fitted into the a priori, ready-made and hardly questionable frameworks of certain 
ideologies, metaphysics, ethics, deontology, or legal systems, or their current 
“developments” and “updates”.1  
 
III. The ontological metaphysics of death and euthanasia 
The ontological, existential and hermeneutical placement of euthanasia is thus 
primarily defined by the “parameters” of the approaches discussed above. It also 
belongs to this same placement that – as previously mentioned – euthanasia is also a 
directly thematizing advancement to the also thematized death, understood directly 
as (one’s own) dying. Which is thus revealed and reveals itself in its existential 
closeness and definite pertinence to that what advances, as directly and clearly its 
own death. The How? and – derivatively – When? of which is not indifferent, as this 
very “thing” forms the problematic subject of a decision connected to these 
questions! 
 There is thus no kind of “negation” of, and no “turning away” or fleeing 
from death, as here we are clearly speaking about a mortal human being, who is 
usually dying. That is, it is not merely – or generally – someone for whom, although 
aware of the finiteness of his life, the name of the end of his life remains a 
“concept”, the concept of death which does not – or may not – necessarily mean his 
own dying as well… 
 In this way euthanasia is an advancement or projection not “generally” to 
death or the particular potentiality of death, but much rather to one’s own imminent 
dying! So, actually, euthanasia is an articulated advancement and protruding 
projection of one’s own dying, which at the same time “brings forth” (one’s own) 
dying, while it stands face to face with it (its own dying), grasped by it.  
 In this respect euthanasia seems to only achieve that which – also seemingly 
– is about to happen anyway (and also soon). A dying man’s state of dying, of being 
in the final stage means in fact: to be in dying, to be just dying… Since euthanasia, 
technically as well, means the medical or medically assisted intervention by which 
an incurable and physically and/or psychologically and/or existentially seriously 
                                                 
1
 So it must be noted here that euthanasia pertains to the ontology and metaphysics of death 
and dying without the ontological and theological sketches of, say, the ideas of natural law. 
suffering human being is quickly and painlessly put to death on account of piety or 
the interest of the dying person.
1
  
 This definition refers of course to the real, willingly intended, so-called 
“active” euthanasia, that is, that form of euthanasia which – incorrectly – is called 
“medically assisted suicide”. Beside this form, there is an indirect, passive kind of 
euthanasia
2
 – also technically speaking – which primarily consists in the ignoring or 
interruption of certain otherwise possible medical procedures.
3
 
 However, euthanasia is in the first place that active or passive medical 
procedure which is initiated or “failed” on the specific request or decision of the 
diseased. The definition must be completed by the fact that such a request or 
decision implicitly reveals the overwhelming and unbearable physical, 
psychological, or cognitive-existential sufferings of the (incurable) diseased, as well.  
 It frequently happens however that this request or decision is not made by 
the diseased, but by one of his or her relatives or an authorized person, as the 
diseased is unable to make decisions or – as in case of underage children – is legally 
not “competent”. This may indeed imply several ethical, legal, and deontological 
problems, but the ontological and existential significance of the subject is still the 
fact that it bears witness to the mortality of the “environment” as well. It is in this 
respect that the connection is made between the existential decision and the personal 
death of a dying person unable to make a decision. 
 From this point of view the second philosophical-existential distinction of 
the thematization of euthanasia lies in the fact that the question of euthanasia always 
implies and asks the question of the “mortality of the environment”. This is so 
precisely because in order for euthanasia to happen, the person who needs it will 
always require the assistance of other people. These people can only consider and 
undertake authentically the unique meaning of the actual request if they project and 
anticipate it to mortality in general, and indirectly to their own mortality and the 
similar possibilities of their own death.  
 Thus, if euthanasia is an explicit possibility and way of becoming a mortal, 
then it does not only mean and imply the mortality of an isolated “individual” or an 
“Ego” closed within itself, but also the mortality of a world structured in a definite 
way and latitude!
4
 In any case: it is now merely death and dying itself which can be 
grasped as unavoidable and imminent in euthanasia, but also its previsioned 
modality, as well as the anticipated time of dying! Precisely of this death, this dying 
                                                 
1
 See: Enikő Školka, Aspecte ale asistenţei bolnavului aflat în stadiul terminal – Posibilităţi, 
limite şi dileme fundamentale (Aspects of terminally ill patients assistance – Possibilities, 
limits, and fundamental dilemmas) (Cluj-Napoca, 2004), 23. 
2
 Anita Hocquard rightfully notes that such kinds of “classifications” usually initially 
correspond to ethical and legal criteria, therefore it is doubtful whether it is possible at all to 
clarify the ethical and legal state of things on the basis of these. Even more so because these 
criteria can be understood differently in different cultures or countries. See: Anita Hocquard, 
L’euthanasie volontaire (Paris, 1999), 11.  
3
 See: Školka, Aspecte ale asistenţei…,  109–110. 
4
 In this sense the “theoretical” or some initially decided legal, deontological or ethical 
restraints of euthanasia always reveal the problematic nature of the mortality of this legal, 
deontological, or ethical world!  
of this particular person and of his or her human life, and the possible human dignity 
pertaining to his or her (present) being, or more exactly the well-defined universality 
– that is, the reflective reference to the world – of this pertinence. This means a 
human dignity which receives a special emphasis by the human universality of death 
in the very act of dying. Because here we are never speaking of a temporary loss of 
dignity, but of a kind which involves the termination of life and as such it 
existentially reflects back– meanwhile! – on the entirety of life. 
 These are the issues raised – though rather externally – when discussing the 
problems connected to the insurance of the right to death beside the right to life. If 
we seriously grasp death as a special something connected to life – that is, life’s 
actually experienced end –, then the dignified ending of human life pertains indeed 
to the humane dignities of human life. Or at least should pertain! 
 Euthanasia is thus first of all a possibility. This also means that it has no 
“unconditioned validity”. It is not and indeed cannot be the exclusive and 
“universal” way of dying. Nevertheless, euthanasia is essentially such a possibility 
which is articulated within the particular ontological-existential potentiality of death. 
Again specifically, of course.  
 Death’s particular potentiality has probably been revealed and analyzed in 
the philosophically most serious and clear way by Martin Heidegger. According to 
him, the first existential and ontological particularity of the potentiality of death is 
the fact that the possibility of death is a certain possibility. It is impossible that it 
might not be, that it might not happen… Thus death is also an intransgressable 
potentiality.
1
 
 In the knowledge of all these it is clear however, that by euthanasia one 
actually grasps or reveals both the certainty and the unavoidability of death, while 
there is a quite well articulated effort to diminish or even eliminate the 
indefinedness
2
 of death. Actually, even according to Heidegger the indefinedness of 
death’s potential nature directly refers to the fact that it is exactly the time of death 
which is undefined and usually also indefinable, too. In relation to this Heidegger 
primarily suggests that in everyday reality – exactly because of this actual 
indefinability – the Dasein tends to escape death and the definition of the time of 
death… But if euthanasia really and exactly means expressed decision over, and 
action towards, the modality of death, then it necessarily touches upon the 
anticipated time of dying as well, in a rather articulated or “predictable”, and indeed 
“calculated” way.  
 That is, the potentiality of death articulated through euthanasia in the 
possibility of dying retains and strengthens its certain and unavoidable nature on the 
one hand, while on the other hand it eliminates its indefinedness, with reference to 
both the time, and primarily the modality of death! This way euthanasia can never be 
regarded as a kind of inauthentic or “escaping” relation to death, which should not 
be “regulated” but only prohibited comfortably and punished… 
                                                 
1
 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Translated by John Maquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), 294. 
2
 Idem, 295. 
 On the contrary, euthanasia is precisely the explicit acceptance of the 
unreferentiality
1
 of the particular potentiality of death. Because the person or 
persons who make the decision stand indeed at the termination of life
2
 as a defined 
and factually final potentiality – and as an explicit “ability of being”. Which, above 
this, must be “taken onto himself alone” as exactly dying! - with a clearly outlined 
unambiguousness.
3
 
 At this point “death does not only “belong” to its own Dasein, but lays claim 
to it as to a singularity.”4 Here one’s own death is also revealed and accepted as the 
most particular potentiality,
5
 which pertains explicitly to the dying person (to 
myself) in general. 
 The unreferentiality of death and dying, as well as the related circumstance 
that death lays claim to the Dasein as a “singularity” does not mean at all – and 
neither does it for Heidegger – that it might not have any kind of interpersonal 
meaning or significance… On the contrary! 
 But these interpersonal meanings cannot influence or eliminate that basic 
and essential reference to myself that it is only I who can and must take my own 
death and dying upon myself, and I cannot under any circumstances transfer it to 
anything or anybody else.  
 That is: I have to take my death upon myself as exactly dying. Such thing 
happens of course in those existential modalities of self-anticipation which directly 
thematize and validate it, such as, for instance, the testaments and decisions 
connected to a possible euthanasia or “more innocent” burial ceremonies and 
modalities.
6
  
 But on what basis can such testaments or testament-like decisions be 
actually applicable for others, involving and even compelling them? Is it not so that 
even the legal validity of testaments originates from, and prevails only and solely on 
the basis of the above discussed ontological foundations? On what basis would the 
others, the caretakers accept as valid my last wishes related to my own dying – or 
euthanasia – or simply the “organization” of my own funeral if not on the basis of 
their acceptance and recognition (though “interpersonally”) of the fact that this issue 
– my death, my dying, and the related problems – essentially, although not 
exclusively, pertain on(to) me?! And also on this account would they feel – probably 
painfully, overwhelmingly, yet essentially – compelled to utmostly fulfill and 
comply with my dispositions and decisions! 
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 Ibid. 
2
 Idem, 295–296. The Heideggerian analyses presented here also show that even Heidegger 
did not confer an adequate and specific existential analytical potentiality to the particular 
problem of dying itself. This can be explained mainly by the fact that Heidegger primarily – 
and rightfully – tried to prove that the Dasein should not actually “become mortal” only in 
this final and “incurably ill” stage of its life, but with regard to its own possible complete 
existence. 
3
 Idem.  
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 That is, to be buried where, how, in what state (e.g., burnt, cremated, or not), with what 
kind of – “secular” or “religious” ceremonies or with no ceremonies, etc.  
Hence derives, primarily and precisely, the most significant conclusion, that 
after all also the so-called interpersonal references related to death, to dying, can 
only be determined in fact based on, and in terms of, the otherwise universal 
ontological nonreferentiality of death, of dying! Exactly “interpersonally”! So, in 
essence, this is what determines the imperative character – for others: the doctor, the 
thanatological caretaker, the notary, the lawyer, the close relative etc. – and also the 
essential validity of the – nonreferential! – choices and decisions of the dying 
person, related to (his or her own) death. This, rather than a “valid” moral customary 
system or juridical system of regulations. And this is reacted to and 
“epiphenomenalized” e.g. by the general respect for the “unconditioned” validity of 
the wishes expressed on the deathbed! 
Thus, dying itself is, on its own, nonreferential… hence, the decision 
related to it of the mortal or dying person bears a special and real interpersonal 
significance, validity and structure, also for the other(s), – mainly for the close 
people, for those around him or her (e.g. caretakers, doctors, family members etc.). 
Otherwise, such a thing would rather be some kind of “negociation” – remaining 
“external”, at least partially, anyway. Instead, the matter is that it is not possible to 
pay regard to such – disposing – decisions and to remain in a mere relation of non-
involvement with them!  
And this is the same reason why, in the case of incapability of decision-
making, it is the interpersonality of close relatives that is put in charge of making 
such a decision, as it always and concretely manifests and represents a phronesis-
like form of biographical interpersonality. A form of interpersonality which, based 
on, and in the sense of, the nonreferentiality of the dying person, and, on the other 
hand, stemming from the biographical relatedness, thematically gains existential – 
thus not necessarily “legal” – right and ground for him/her or them to assume and to 
make the decision, as well as to achieve – depending on the possibilities – that the 
respective decision should then be really and actually performed as such. 
 
IV. Euthanasia and interpersonality 
However, the interpersonality that is necessarily constituted under the circumstances 
of euthanasia is certainly not restricted to the above mentioned references. 
Moreover, it is mostly factually related to the person who “carries it out” or assists 
it.  
In relation with this, it is important to repeatedly emphasize the fact that 
also this interpersonality is completely, expressedly reflective! As the authenticity 
condition of such factual interpersonality is that these people – also personally! – 
should be in a relationship, endeavoring to authenticity, with their own mortal 
nature, with their own death, expressedly and factually foreshadowed as dying – 
though not “current” for the time being! It is only in this context that they can 
actually meet and understand the other, dying person’s claim of euthanasia!  
In this respect euthanasia means – in this basic sense – nothing else than a 
determined meeting of existences in their own – and each other’s – mortal nature, 
which is certain, unavoidable and never controllable in advance – and, because of 
this, nonreferential! Euthanasia is a meeting, in which all of them, all of us must 
expressedly and actually become “mortal”.  
This is why the “decision itself” – especially the final decision – never 
derives from the framework of the external, already existing  – or nonexisting – 
legal, deontological etc. dispositions, but only from those ontological-existential 
sources from which, in a concealed, invisible, not openly assumed manner, any kind 
of regulation stems, and from which these acquire their actual validity and 
authenticity.  
Certainly, this does not mean at all that the people taking part in the 
decision-making and in its community-meeting, which always proves to be 
interpersonal, with respect to its final condition – because of the radical differences 
of situations and “roles” –, should be present with equal importance! After all, 
always, only the death of “one of them” is in question at that moment!  
It does not mean either that merely externally codified “deontological” 
obligations of other people (e.g. the doctor, the close family members etc.) could be 
assigned to the externally outlined personal rights – let us say, to the right of the 
frequently debated “dignified death”. 
On the contrary, we should rather speak here about an essential, substantial, 
qualitative meeting of personal rights and obligations, as, when the right to dignified 
death is in question, then we do not only – and never! – refer to the right of the 
dying person claiming his or her right to euthanasia, but also to the personal 
involvement of the doctor or the codifier as well. On the other hand, as we have 
already mentioned, it should also be discussed that euthanasia – occurring as an 
interpersonal question – also implies unavoidably the outlined possibility of 
everyone’s attitude, whether authentic or not, to their own mortal nature and their 
own dying. And this personally involves the other person, the doctor or the close 
relative.  
This is why it is basically wrong to place the medical deontological question 
and, together with it, the doctor’s person in the centre of the so-called “problem of 
euthanasia”.1 As noone else should be in the focus of the question of euthanasia but 
the dying person claiming his or her dignified death through euthanasia!
2
 The one 
who is helped by euthanasia to die under circumstances of supposed dignity.  
                                                 
1
 Not to mention that in this way the person of the “doctor” also remains totally abstract. As 
the possible “executor” of euthanasia is mostly not “any kind” of doctor – e.g. not a dentist, 
not a dissector, not a plastic surgeon etc. –, but primarily one who is specialized – by the 
way, based on his or her own decisions – in the treatment of those diseases, in the case of 
which the occurrence of incurable cases is very likely, or which, according to the present 
state of medicine, are considered as incurable. And the treatment of which is not curing, but 
only the treatment of symptoms or experimental research. On the other hand, it is also 
problematical whether the deontological considerations are themselves automatically moral. 
As the codifications of the deontological considerations formulate their regulations in an 
abstract, impersonal way, in this way their agent is a general executor rather than a particular 
medical expert who pursues his or her profession in a personal concrete manner.   
2
 It was Cecília Lippai’s Master’s degree dissertation entitled Eutanázia, jelenvalólét és 
necro-philia (Euthanasia, Dasein and Necrophilia) that most convincingly drew my 
attention to the fact that it is mistaken to place the person of the doctor and the deontological 
questions in the focus of the matter of euthanasia (manuscript). 
In any case, the debates and considerations related to euthanasia 
must/should in fact be only and exclusively oriented by the considerations related to 
the specific ontology, existentiality and metaphysical facticity of death, of dying. As 
this – and only this! – can reflect on the questions of who death belongs to, how one 
belongs to his or her own death, and how one’s own death belongs to one’s own self.  
Certainly, such an approach also determines the areas and possessors of 
competence of the “decisions” related to death, to one’s own dying! In short: 
actually and primarily everyone, anyone can make ontologically and existentially 
“grounded”, and in this way interpersonally meaningful and valid decisions, 
exclusively related to their own death, to their own dying. The interpersonal validity 
of these decisions can only mean that in fact, in connection with the decision of the 
only competent decision-maker, the other people do not have and cannot have any 
other “ethical”, “deontological”, “legal” etc. responsibilities or pondered obligations, 
than putting it forward – also taking into account and weighing their own mortal 
nature. Even in the form of not interfering into the – momentary, as we cannot speak 
of any other form – impeding of the person’s death. 
 This is what the actual competence of any “death-ethics”, “thanatological 
deontology” and legal codification endeavoring to authenticity is – essentially – 
confined to, and beyond this, only restricted to prevention from the possible abuses 
of euthanasia.   
However, the possibility of abuses of the euthanasia is not a reason for 
refusing it.  But of course neither for accepting it. Especially as such a thing – in 
other words, “the abuse of euthanasia” – is not at all euthanasia, but mostly real 
murder. With respect to this euthanasia must also be regulated and controlled as 
well.  
It is also here that we should include the so-called “pedagogical” functions 
of death. Regarding its “usefulness”, we people – also listening to the exhortations 
of philosophers – could at last accept death as our “master”. In other words, in these 
“functions” the regulators and the supervisors could assist also pedagogically, so 
that the human beings with a limited mortal span should anyway become really 
mortal. Including the present and future generations.
1
 And us as well.  
But the ethical worriers, the metaphysical thinkers, the deontologists, the 
legal experts as well as the fulminating propagators of ideologies – still – are mortal 
themselves. Sooner or later, by facing their own dying, they also have to account for 
their ethical, ideological, legal etc. “systems” – ontologically! – grounded by, and – 
again ontologically! – stemming from, death and dying.    
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 As far as thanatological education is concerned, it equally refers to the work to be carried 
out in any kinds of educational institutions, schools, universities … Including the training of 
“professionals” as well, as “taking care” of people being in the last stage of their lives 
requires special skills and competences, both on the part of professionals and close relatives. 
It is considered an educational task to inform, to provide counselling etc. for the latter ones. 
However, it also includes information and education by means of the media. In this respect, 
the endeavours existing for years, initiated by the BBC and the Discovery Channel, namely 
the broadcast of so-called “thanatological” films, are very interesting. These films have a 
scientific and documentary value, they are not just “popularizing” creations.  
Especially as there is no immediate “sociological” relationship between the 
spreading of such a pedagogy – supported by more and more people – and the 
prospective statistical increase of the claims for euthanasia. As this “depends” more 
directly on several other factors, for example, on how many people get into the final 
stage of their lives, whose diseases cause sufferings  that prove to be unbearable and 
unworthy of them etc.…1 Or on when, where and to what extent are the suffering, ill 
people informed on the nature of their diseases, on  its actual “stage”, on the possible 
outcome of their diseases, and in connection with these, on the prospective 
consequences – again and essentially worthy of the patient’s “informed” knowledge 
–, which affect human dignity.2 
                                                 
1
 Although it is not advisable and not proper to get involved in “statistics” and “percentages”, 
still, we can mention that the research in this matter, carried out in the Netherlands, clearly 
proves that the change of the requests for euthanasia mainly depends on the efficiency of 
palliative care, that is, the efficient care of unbearable symptoms. (Of course, it is possible to 
carry out such “real” research in the Netherlands, as there euthanasia is permitted in a legally 
codified way. Of course in places where there are no such regulations or permissions, it is 
not even possible to study the matter of euthanasia. This also means that every ban on 
euthanasia actually results in the lack of its concrete study. As under such circumstances 
there is not what and how to study. What is more, beyond the “opinion inventories” such a 
thing perpetuates these situations.) See: Jean-Jacques Georges, Bregje D. Onwuteaka-
Philipsen, Gerrit van der Wal, Agnes van der Heide, and Paul J. van der Maas, “Differences 
between terminally ill cancer patients who died after euthanasia had been performed and 
terminally ill cancer patients did not request euthanasia,” Palliative Medicine 19 (2005): 
578–586. Other research led to similar results. See also: Johansen, Sissel, Jacob Chr. Holen, 
Stein Kaasa, Jon Havard Loge, and Lars Johan Matersvedt. “Attitudes toward, and wishes 
for, euthanasia,” 454-460. 
2
 In several countries – e.g. in Romania, but not only here –, of course among widespread 
deontological worries, it is not considered as one of the medical obligations to directly and 
honestly inform the patient on his or her health condition. Of course, this is the case of 
incurable, degenerative diseases causing immediate death. “Information” is mostly restricted 
to informing the family members and close relatives, putting them, their insight and 
“competence” in charge of the possible information of the patient. Under such 
circumstances, of course, the “question” and “possibility” of euthanasia can emerge in a 
“specific” way.  See also: Dominique Thouvenin, Le secret médical et l’information du 
malade (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1982), 167–198. On the contrary, in the 
United States of America, in Canada, in Japan etc. it is a medical obligation to immediately 
and personally inform the patients, and one consequence of this deontological mentality has 
been the establishment and continuous development of the so-called hospice-system. 
However, this is not at all an “alternative” to euthanasia! Moreover, in this system not even 
the suicide of the patients was directly impeded. There it is previously made clear, who is the 
person empowered by the patient to make decisions related to the patient’s life and condition, 
in case the outcome of the disease should undermine the patient’s decision-making capacity. 
However, until then, the hospice-patients can record in writing their will regarding the 
circumstances under which no more treatments prolonging their lives should be started, or 
the existing “treatments” should be stopped. See: Školka, Aspecte ale asistenţei…,103–104. 
“By choosing the hospice-system, the patient accepts the unavoidability of his or her death, 
and accepts that there will be no more trials to stop the disease.” In: Ibid., 103. 
At any rate, what essentially distinguishes euthanasia from murder is that it 
is carried out on the basis of the decision of the actually dying person – on death’s 
doorstep, existentially advancing to his or her own imminent mortality
1
 –, or on his 
or the empowered person’s expressed request – not only with his agreement, but 
actually on his determined initiative. As opposed to murder, euthanasia suspends by 
no means the possibilities of a nonreferential facing of one’s own death.2  
What essentially distinguishes euthanasia from suicide is that euthanasia 
does not eliminate the concept of the metaphysical fact of death, of dying, and does 
not change it – as suicide does – into a brutum factum.3 Even if one way of 
euthanasia is named – figuratively and erroneously in fact – “medically assisted 
suicide”. As in these cases the matter is, on one hand, only that the medicine itself 
which induces death, and its effective “doses” are established with the professional 
expertise of a doctor; on the other hand, that the respective patient administers it by 
himself/herself. In this case we cannot speak about an isolating-isolated suicide, but 
rather about an explicitly determined, special interpersonal euthanatological 
communication and assistance.   
Independently of this, the presence of euthanasia – as self-preceding and as 
immediate presence – is mostly the presence of the already – incurably – ill person 
being in the “last stage” of the illness and of life. The person is not – “specifically” – 
“death-ill” in the Kierkegaardian sense, but most of the time actually ill, a dying 
person, at death’s doorstep.  The “patient” by all means. Not anyone else.   
But not Anyone! As the presence of euthanasia involves assuming one’s 
own mortal nature and dying: one existentially decides upon this!   
In this respect euthanasia – as we said – is a possibility. As such, it does not 
have any “unconditioned validity”. However, it is a real, factual possibility. It may 
already be obvious that the real-factual possibility of euthanasia is in essence similar 
to what Aristotle – and after him also Hans-Georg Gadamer – interpreted as 
phronesis.  
But phronesis is exactly that basic, essential moral-practical discretion 
which always aims at the concrete situation in fact, and as such, it cannot dispose of 
the previousness of acquirable knowledge.
4
 The matter itself always requires 
“negotiation with ourselves”.5 In this respect, understanding stands at the basis of, 
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 There is and there can be nothing extraordinary about the fact that if a person, still in “good 
health”, thinking of the possibility that he or she will suffer from an incurable disease which 
will threaten and undermine his or her capacity of making a decision, should dispose “in 
advance” in connection with the circumstances of his or her future euthanasia.  
2
 In what follows, we will analyze in detail the differences between euthanasia and murder.  
3
 This is the essential “difference” between euthanasia and suicide, rather than the fact that in 
the “case” of the self-murderer, the existence of the illness cannot be established, as some 
doctors doing research in the question think. See for example: Kyriaki Mystakidou, “The 
evolution of euthanasia and its perception in Greek culture and civilization,” Perspectives in 
Biology and Medicine 1 (2005): 95–105. Certainly, in what follows, we must return to these 
aspects of the question as well.  
4
 See: Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall (London: Continuum, 2004),  p. 18 
5
 Ibid., 309 and Martin Heidegger, Being and time. 
and inside, phronesis. We have seen that understanding is essentially a projection. A 
projection and an opening towards the possibilities, which are always directed by the 
“possibility of the impossibility”.  
In the present context, these considerations primarily mean, of course, that 
in fact we can never acquire in advance the knowledge related to how it is “ethical”, 
how it is “correct”, “advisable” to die, how one must die etc. Dying has no 
acquirable, transmittable, teachable know how, it is impossible for it to have one. 
Not even the name of “euthanasia ” – meaning “good death” – interprets death as 
being “good” in the sense of acquisition or technical “transmission”, “practice” or 
“pursue” in some kind of a learning process. Instead, it problematically refers to 
dying, exactly to the particular case of the particular dying person.   
In connection with this matter, it is in fact not possible to oppose “one 
opinion to another”. As the opinions, the “standpoints” in essence do not refer – 
cannot refer – to the same “thing”. For the same reason the sentences of the present 
paper certainly do not take a stand, either for, or against euthanasia.   
But they stand for one’s possibility to take a stand for his or her own death – 
or his or her own dying –, to make a decision – for or against – in this matter. 
Certainly, the same considerations should in fact orientate the medical, 
deontological or juridical approaches to this matter as well. However, the original 
medical oath, the Hippocratic Oath, which, to everyone’s knowledge, forbids 
euthanasia and “medically assisted suicide”, simplifies rather than takes on the 
actual moral – and not only “deontological”, but in essence really phronesis-like – 
question, concealing the ontological references and aspects.  
In this respect euthanasia is – repeatedly and essentially – a possibility. It is 
a possibility which directly, explicitly alludes to the sui generis potentiality of death, 
of human death itself. Certainly, this allusion is factually essential, as it refers back, 
it makes us reflect on the fact that man is mortal “all the time”... 
One does not become mortal merely when getting closer to death, reaching 
the last stage of one’s life, or at the point of dying! Eventually, “being mortal” 
means dying “in some way” at the existential end of life – as actually, existentially 
ending it. 
However, the advancement to death, to one’s death, to which Heidegger 
also attaches such a great importance, remains a mere mirage until – in spite of the 
really existing possibility or danger of everydayness or non-actuality – it does not 
refer “at all” to the nature of some kind of death interpreted as dying!  
As a consequence of this, dying – my own dying! – can be “like this” or 
“like that”, or even “different”!1 And it can be something that – as a consequence of 
the fact that death, our own death existentially belongs to us, and in spite of its 
undetermined nature – is probably never indifferent for existence.  
In this way, the possibility of reaching and advancing to death, in terms of 
becoming mortal, “naturally” and organically also means – or may mean – the self-
preceding, forward-pointing advancement, as far as the expressed “How?” of our 
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 And because of this the “immortal” and “immortality” – which we had to touch upon at the 
beginning of the present discourse – has “nothing to do with” or no “competence” regarding 
the questions of death and dying! 
death is concerned.
1
 As the ontological and existential meaning of the previous and 
horizon-like, but still well determined decision is that this is actually the self-
preceding, the advancing to death, to dying itself, or, to be more precise, the always 
expressed and thematic – not only implied or merely generally “presupposed” – 
advancement. In which there are totally different “dispositions”, such as the ones 
related to possessions in connection with which the “right” of making a will is 
usually not questioned.  
In other words, the possible euthanasia can (also) be decided upon or 
disposed of. So clearly, that it is possible that, depending on the actual situation, the 
decision itself will prove to be useless and void. As the actual “circumstances”, 
which are previously always uncontrollable, may or will be also different.
2
 
In any case, it may have become obvious from what has been said that 
actually it is necessary first to think over the ontological investigations related to 
death, if we want then to really understand and “appreciate” the ethical and moral – 
generally called “ethical”, but mostly only ideologically determined –, and legal, 
deontological, and thanatological considerations, references (also) related to 
euthanasia, as well as the actual – that is, really “legitimate”! – “competences” 
related to it! It is only based on these that we will be able then to reflect upon 
“ideologies” in a legitimate way! In other words, not only on what these 
“ideologies” aim to see, but also on what they actually have in view.   
As there is a difference – an essential difference – between “killing” 
regarded as, generally speaking, the extermination of the “living being” in general or 
in particular,
3
 or its deprivation of its life, and its meaning in terms of the 
expectations of the dying person, becoming mortal, and hopelessly suffering, 
through his or her biographical interpersonality, also openly expressed as its 
consequence, to help him or her die in dignity. Certainly, even in a way that, 
ignoring the medical deontological and other moralizing considerations, we do not 
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 Although ending human life as a consequence of a decision – similar to the death of victims 
of accidents, murders or suicides – can indeed hardly be considered as “natural” death. 
Whereas any kind of death resulting from some kind of “civilization disease” is mostly 
unproblematically regarded as “natural” … However, we rarely ask whether life, full of 
chemicals, plastic, medicines, environmental pollution and all kinds of stress … can still be 
accounted for as “natural”. In other words, even nowadays we rarely ask why a more and 
more unnatural – but not necessarily more “inhuman” – life should by all means be ended in 
a way considered – of course, artificially – as “natural”. Obviously, this fact betrays much 
about the real profoundness of “natural law” approaches. About what these approaches 
regard in connection with the fact that, only because man is by nature mortal, he can build up 
and end his life also in any kind of unnatural way.  
2
 For example I can make a will in advance regarding the circumstances and questions 
related to my euthanasia … then it may happen that actually I will die as a victim of a sudden 
heart attack. However, I can also avoid the worries of such a will that looks ahead, without 
avoiding the possibly totally “inhuman” and unworthy miseries of torturing death, and the 
actual challenging-trying experience of these... As it also happened to Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich. 
3
 Language – at least the Hungarian language – uses the same word for killing a man and 
killing… a pig!  
artificially prolong the dying process of the suffering, dying person, who wants to 
die, on behalf of prolonging “life” or expecting a miracle. 
As in these cases in fact it is not the person’s “life”, but the process of dying 
that is “prolonged”.  
Based on these, and summing up what has been said so far, we can go 
further with reflections, as we can now more precisely determine the ontological-
hermeneutical specificity of euthanasia – treated at the beginning of the study –, 
taking into account its existential ontological structure.  
As a result of our investigation so far, it has been made clear that euthanasia 
is in fact one specifically structured (regarding its expressed and existential 
structure) –  certainly also existential ontological – possibility of becoming mortal, 
on the one hand, and on the other hand that of dying itself. Obviously, as any 
possibility, the possibility of euthanasia is constituted and structured by certain well 
determined conditions. In the sense of, and depending on, these conditions, it may be 
obvious now that euthanasia is in fact nothing else but a possibility of one’s 
becoming mortal and of one’s dying, outlined and structured by decision, 
communication, dialogue and cooperation!
1
 
Based on all these results, and with the help of all these possibilities, we can 
now undertake to outline the specific ontological-existential structure of euthanasia. 
At the same time the merely formal and doubtful-obscure level of “treating” and 
reflecting on this subject can be surpassed.  
According to these: although the euthanasia turns the fact of the process and 
events of death, of dying, into an act, still its ontological-existential structure 
basically differs from any other factual or possible type of dying! Primarily it differs 
from the existential-ontological structures of murder (killing a man) and suicide, 
which euthanasia, in spite of this, is so frequently and thoughtlessly mistaken for.  
As for example suicide, though it “contains” the decision of the person to 
die, he or she is short of dialogue and communication with others, of cooperating 
with others while carrying out, committing the act. As far as the murder, the 
expressed act of killing the other person is concerned, in it the victim never takes 
part in his or her own dying, in the sense of a decision made by himself or herself in 
this respect; and certainly the dialogue-communication, as well as the cooperation 
with the murderer is missing from the ontological-existential structure of murder. 
What is more, it is to be remarked that it is the decision itself that is always missing 
from the existential-ontological structure of the so-called “natural” death.   
Consequently, as compared to all the other possibilities and ways of dying, 
the existential-ontological structure of euthanasia indicates basic differences and 
specificities, which means that it is not possible to mistake it for these forms with 
such superficiality and carelessness.  
Based on all these considerations, it has hopefully been made clear enough 
that euthanasia – though it is an act that directly brings forth death in most cases – is 
by no means murder. As, though it is one’s own decision regarding his or her own 
                                                 
1
 In order to avoid misunderstanding, it must be made clear that here the matter is not the 
impossibility of constitutive communication of dying itself, but rather the communication 
related to becoming mortal and related to making the decision.  
death – or the decision of another, expressedly or biographically implicitly 
empowered person –, the dying person, whose death is the consequence of dialogue, 
communication and cooperation – in a dialogical sense –, is indeed a victim, 
however, not the victim of the other person carrying out the euthanasia, assisting his 
or her death, but exclusively the victim of his or her own disease and state.      
Thus what happens to one, brought forth by himself or herself, during the 
act of euthanasia, is by no means murder, it is in fact an assistance to dignified dying 
and death, which not only makes possible, but also presupposes the dying person’s 
facing his or her own mortality, what is more, his or her own constitutive death, and 
expressedly assuming one’s death. As such, it is not only a well-determined way of 
making explicit the expressed reasons for life and death, but also their interpretation 
in form of application!   
It is such an interpretation and such an expressed way of grasping meanings, 
with regard to the ontological-existential structure of the phenomenon, which – due 
to its specific situation – even “deontologically”! – results in the constituting and 
opening up of the – certainly also essentially ontological-existential – obligations of 
the very determinations and horizons of the meanings! Thus it essentially differs 
from the exercise of some patronizing or merciful “graces”. 
The fact that criminal law systems as well as the deontological constructions 
have hardly any knowledge of all this, reveals those existential insufficiencies and 
inadequacies, which were mentioned at the beginning of the study.   
Indeed – in the stream of tradition deriving from Roman law – each and 
every way of depriving people from their life, of causing human death, is juridically 
regarded – most of the time, but not in every case1 – as some kind of murder, which 
has to be reacted to and treated – punished – according to criminal law. To such an 
extent that the deprivation of life with one’s own hands – even suicide itself – is 
considered, at least linguistically, as “murder”.2  
In the meantime criminal law claims that it defends not only people’s lives, 
physical safety and health, but beyond this, it protects their freedom, dignity and 
honesty  – as moral personalities – as well.3 Obviously, not in what concerns their 
relationships to themselves, but especially in their interpersonal, social relations.   
However, neither the juridical – e.g. criminal – nor the medical 
deontological status quo obliges the philosophical analysis of things to anything! As 
this latter one always focuses on the “things themselves”, and, certainly, mainly not 
from the perspective of the prevailing status quo, but from that of the authenticity 
horizons of the possibilities. In this respect, the supposed matter and tendency is that 
– as it used to be in the case of suicide – the various legal systems and legal 
practices – as well as the medical deontologies – are prone to admit and to assume 
the essential ontological-existential position of dying and of becoming mortal, as 
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 For example euthanasia is no longer considered murder in the Netherlands.  
2
 If there is anybody left to be punished ... Those who tried to commit suicide were held 
responsible by criminal law in many places for a long time. Not to mention the punishments 
of the church – also affecting the dead –, which are still existent. 
3
 See: George Antoniu, “Ocrotirea penală a vieţii persoanei,” (The criminal defence of 
personal life), Revista de Drept Penal 1 ( 2002): 9. 
well as the aura and weight of the possibilities of these. In other words, what can be 
analyzed and pointed out only by philosophy. As – among other aspects – 
philosophy can make exactly such things clear, and, also among other things, this is 
what the assigned and applied dignity of philosophy lies in.   
It is often said about philosophy that it does not result in any real and factual 
knowledge. It is also said that the insights of philosophy cannot be applied, “used” 
in fact in anything. However, a possible result of the above reflections would be to 
refute this belief, by the analysis of a really “current” (euthanasia), and always 
“vital” question, that is, the question of death.   
By such an approach it becomes “possible”, and utterly factual for us to 
actually face, on the one hand, the challenge of the matter of euthanasia, on the other 
hand, to actually become aware of our own mortal nature and death, and in the third 
place, to encounter the questions and reinterpretations of philosophy by means of 
philosophical thought, and – why not – of the power of philosophizing.  
These reflections point out the fact that the problems related to euthanasia 
essentially and factually derive from man’s mortal nature, an existentially 
problematic issue from the very beginning, and they allude back and forth to these 
questions. Also from this perspective, reflecting on the problem of euthanasia is a 
true philosophical and existential – historical existential – chance.  
It is such a challenge and such an opportunity which has to be faced with a 
proper attitude as it is not all the same either from the perspective of our own death 
or of the further development of the history of existence! And eventually, as this is 
the very stake of the matter!  
 
